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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 11-2412 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CARLOS HERNANDEZ,  
a/k/a LOS’ 
 
 
CARLOS HERNANDEZ, 
                                           Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:02-cr-00684-004) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2012 
 
Before: VANASKIE, BARRY and CUDAHY,*
(Opinion Filed:  June 21, 2012) 
 Circuit Judges 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
                                              
 * Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.   
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 Carlos Hernandez appeals from the judgment entered in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey revoking his supervised release and sentencing him 
to 24 months’ imprisonment.  Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
counsel for Hernandez filed a brief and a motion for leave to withdraw, asserting that 
there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal.  We agree.  Accordingly, we will grant the 
motion for leave to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment.1
I. 
   
 On May 5, 2006, Hernandez was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment to be 
followed by five years of supervised release on his conviction in the District of New 
Jersey for conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine.  Hernandez’s supervised release 
commenced on May 21, 2008.  
 On November 17, 2009, a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under 
Supervision was filed, alleging that Hernandez violated supervised release by: (1) being 
arrested on a drug charge in New York; (2) possessing a firearm; (3) leaving New Jersey 
without permission; (4) failing to notify his probation officer of the New York arrest; and 
(5) possessing a controlled substance.  On December 7, 2010, the petition was amended 
to allege that Hernandez had been convicted in New York on the charge of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance and had been sentenced to three years in state 
custody.  The remaining violations were reiterated in the amended petition. 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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 The District Court held a revocation hearing on May 10, 2011.  At that time, 
Hernandez was serving his three-year state court sentence for the attempted possession 
conviction, the same conviction that served as a basis for the amended petition to revoke 
supervised release.  After the District Court questioned Hernandez regarding his 
understanding of the elements of the violation and that it carried a potential maximum 
sentence of 60 months in prison, Hernandez admitted that he had indeed been convicted 
in New York on the charge of attempted possession of heroin.  
 Hernandez’s advisory guideline range was 8 to 14 months because the attempted 
possession conviction was a Grade B violation and he was in criminal history category 
III.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).  The District Court, exercising its discretion, imposed a 
sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to any term of imprisonment 
Hernandez was currently serving. 
 On May 11, 2011, Hernandez, proceeding pro se, presented to the court a letter 
that contested his revocation sentence.  Hernandez’s pro se submission contended that he 
should have received credit against his revocation sentence from October 29, 2010, until 
May 10, 2011.  On May 16, 2011, counsel for Hernandez asked the District Court to 
characterize the defendant’s submission as seeking relief to correct or reduce a sentence 
under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than a notice of 
appeal as it was initially docketed.  The District Court agreed to construe the letter as a 
Rule 35(a) motion.  Observing that “no arithmetical, technical or other clear [error] 
occurred in that the Court [o]rdered the sentence imposed to run consecutively to any 
other sentence, and . . . the Bureau of Prisons will give credit against the sentence for 
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whatever time in custody federal law permits,” the District Court denied Hernandez’s 
motion.  (A. 10.)   
 Hernandez, again proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal on May 17, 2011.2
II. 
  
By Order entered June 6, 2011, trial court counsel was directed to continue to represent 
Hernandez on appeal.  Counsel for Hernandez has now moved for leave to withdraw, 
asserting that there are no nonfrivolous issues to present for our consideration.   
 Pursuant to Anders, counsel for a defendant may seek to withdraw if after 
reviewing the District Court record, he or she is “persuaded that the appeal presents no 
issue of even arguable merit.”  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  When presented with such a 
request, our responsibility is to determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled 
[Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a)’s] requirements; and (2) whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  Specifically, counsel is 
required “(1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in 
search of appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  In conducting an independent review of the record, “we confine our 
scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by an adequate Anders brief” and “those 
                                              
 2 In his notice of appeal, Hernandez does not challenge either the revocation of 
supervised release or the prison term imposed by the District Court.  Instead, he again 
complains that he was entitled to credit against his federal prison term.  Specifically, he 
asserts that he is entitled to credit from July 9, 2010, presumably when a federal detainer 
was lodged against him, until May 10, 2011, when he was sentenced.  
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issues raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.”  Id. at 301.  Hernandez, although informed of 
his right to file a brief on his own, has not submitted any document to this Court since 
filing his notice of appeal.  
 Counsel for Hernandez examined the record, and we are convinced that counsel 
has identified all appealable issues and explained why those issues are frivolous.  Based 
on our independent review of the record, we agree that there are no meritorious issues 
because (1) Hernandez knowingly and voluntarily admitted that he violated the terms of 
supervised release, (2) the District Court imposed a procedurally sound and substantively 
reasonable sentence, and (3) the Bureau of Prisons, not the courts, will determine whether 
Hernandez should receive federal custodial credits for prison time served prior to the 
May 10, 2011 revocation of supervised release. 
A. 
 Because Hernandez admitted to violating the terms of supervised release, “the 
inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and 
voluntary.”  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  There is no dispute that 
Hernandez was represented by counsel.  Whether his admission to violating supervised 
release was knowing and voluntary is assessed in the context of the totality of the 
circumstances.  See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006).  In this 
case, the District Court conducted an adequate colloquy that assured that Hernandez 
knowingly and voluntarily admitted violating the terms of supervised release by having 
been convicted in state court of attempted possession of a controlled substance.  The 
District Court repeatedly questioned Hernandez, asking whether he had ample time to 
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speak with counsel about the revocation proceeding and offering to provide additional 
time for consultation if Hernandez deemed it necessary.  The District Court also 
repeatedly explained that the violation of supervised release carried a maximum potential 
penalty of 60 months’ imprisonment.  On every occasion, Hernandez acknowledged that 
he understood the potential penalty.  Additionally, in open court, Hernandez recognized 
that he violated the terms of supervised release because of his conviction in New York 
and asked for leniency at sentencing.  Accordingly, any claim that Hernandez did not 
knowingly and voluntarily admit the supervised release violation would be frivolous.   
B. 
 Any attack on the reasonableness of the sentence is also meritless.  The District 
Court followed proper procedure by calculating the advisory guideline range, considering 
any departure motions, and weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  See 
United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).   
 In the context of revocation sentences, we examine the substantive 
“reasonableness with regard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  The District 
Court noted that Hernandez committed a very serious crime that involved a suspected 
$18,000 worth of heroin after being released from prison for a conviction that entailed 
similar conduct.  The District Court also cited a need to protect the public because of the 
seriousness of the offense and Hernandez’s repeated criminal conduct.  The District 
Court considered these factors, while also recognizing that Hernandez cooperated with 
authorities, in fashioning the above-guideline range sentence.   
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 It is also not unreasonable to have the revocation sentence run consecutively to the 
state court conviction that served as the basis for the supervised release revocation.  In 
fact, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend that Hernandez’s revocation term of 
imprisonment be served consecutively to the conviction for the underlying offense.  See 
U.S.S.G § 7B1.3(f).  Accordingly, the District Court was well within its discretion to 
impose the 24 month sentence to be served consecutively to the underlying New York 
state drug conviction.   
C. 
 Counsel concludes the Anders brief by explaining that Hernandez’s contention, 
asserted in his pro se notice of appeal, that he is entitled to federal custodial credits 
against his revocation sentence is not properly before us at this time.  We agree with 
counsel’s analysis.  We do not have the authority to award Hernandez federal custodial 
credits for the time he served while awaiting the resolution of his supervised release 
revocation proceeding.  The authority to calculate a federal sentence and provide credit 
for time served is delegated to the Attorney General, who acts through the Bureau of 
Prisons.  See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992).  Therefore, 
Hernandez’s claim is not ripe for review by the courts until he pursues and exhausts the 
issue with the Bureau of Prisons.   
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
and grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw.    
